【原标题：LED反中国言论：为了骂中国不带脏字 安全意识亟待提升】财金网消息 “锐实力”，披着学术外衣的骂人话

网站在转发该文时，用的标题是“为了骂中国不带脏字，西方又发明一个新词!”。该社评原文如下：

脑子都用这儿了!

西方给中俄编了个“锐实力”概念，近来逐渐流行开来。当它被用在中国头上时，主要是指中国的对外文化交流受政府控制，并且有对西方国家进行价值观渗透、干预文化领域各种自由的政治目的。

英国《经济学人》不久前用封面文章描述中国的“锐实力”，美国《外交事务》杂志新近刊登的约瑟夫·奈文章重点探讨了如何用软实力对抗中俄的“锐实力”。

西方战略界善于炮制各种概念，但“锐实力”这个词的价值判断过于明显。它从一走上西方媒体，就被用来描述中俄的行为，说不好听的，它就是加在硬实力和软实力中间的披着学术外衣的骂人话。

做同样的事，美国和西方是展现软实力，中俄则是使用锐实力。比如美国的基金会在中国资助学术研究，是软实力。中国香港的中美交流基金会资助得州大学奥斯汀分校，就成了锐实力。在中国有德国的歌德学院，西班牙的塞万提斯学院，它们都是软实力，中国在世界各地办的孔子学院，就被约瑟夫·奈贴上“锐实力”标签。

中国有意愿通过“渗透”改变美国和西方社会的价值观，影响那里的学术及言论自由吗?全体中国人都会觉得这个问题有点莫名其妙，因为这既超出了中国的能力，也不符合中国对外交流的基本理念。

如果说中国想在对外文化交流中产生什么影响，它的唯一指向就是促使那个国家的对华态度更友好些。给西方国家的社会治理打上一些中国的烙印，意识形态领域发生一些价值上的变异，不能不说中国人连想都没想过，是一些西方人的脑瓜转得太快了，我们的感觉是有点跟不上。

西方舆论这一轮对中国“锐实力”的指责和炒作给了我们一个感慨：西方真的不自信了。这个概念的提出也许意味着西方对华全面攻势向守势过渡的开始。

总结最近一些年的变化，我们发现，西方的对华影响力在不断衰减，中国社会的集体自信持续上升。西方价值观骄傲地在中国到处插小旗子的时代已近黄昏，中国经济实力在西方的扩散让一些人担心会出现一个不一样的黎明。

首先，西方人权观念在中国的传播已经进入死胡同，变成与极少数异见人士和民族分裂分子搞到一起，完全脱离了中国广大民众的诉求。以至于西方一对中国谈人权，中国公众比官员还反感，大家都觉得这是西方在找中国的麻烦。

人权是西方影响中国社会的核心观念之一，人权攻势的瓦解拉黑、调暗了西方其他软实力的魅力。中国人的人文自信迅速回升，中西之间开始迈入新的思想平等时代，这是几个世纪以来不曾有过的。

其实硬实力、软实力的划分是西方对自身情况的总结，中国与西方的基本国情本就有很大不同，这决定了中国力量的组成形态和使用逻辑也都有别于西方。中西交流需要全面相互适应，而不是以西方利益为中心，套用西方的标准，对中西交流评头论足，并将这些评价伪装成国际社会的态度。

有一点很重要，西方已经指挥不了世界的大脑，无论西方说什么，只要中国方面坚持自己的原则和立场，不以西方的话语逻辑为基础与之互动，他们那些人的鼓噪就转化不成某种现实推力。西方的很多人大概隐约感到了这一点，这增加了他们的焦虑，也使他们对中国有可能反过来“渗透西方”而忧心忡忡。

环球时报这篇驳斥“锐实力”(Sharp power)的社评，一如既往地锐利，而且在网络上的传播效果也一如既往地锐不可当，获得网民点赞无数。

话说这个锐字，似乎并不是贬义词，至少在汉语中如此;在西语中也最多不过是个中性词。比如锐不可当、锐意进取、披坚执锐、养精蓄锐……都是非常正能量的励志好词。

但是为什么环球时报今天要批这个Sharp power呢?为什么它要说“锐实力”是一个骂人不带脏字的坏词呢?

有好事者把《经济学人》12月16日那篇头条文章《Sharp power》翻译成了中文，那就来看看它究竟是什么货色吧——读完你就知道环球时报为什么要发这篇社评了。

锐实力

——中国正在操纵西方民主国家的言论。中国人要做什么?

当一个崛起中的大国挑战现有的超级大国，战争常常会随之到来。希腊历史学家首次描述了这种可能出现的情况，并把它称作“修昔底德陷阱”。修昔底德陷阱又再次令人担忧地出现在中国和西方的关系中，尤其是中美关系。如今，两强之间潜在的冲突对抗不断升级。即使中国不寻求征服外国的土地，但许多人也很害怕，它会寻求征服外国人的人心。

澳大利亚首当其冲。对于中国的这种策略，澳大利亚已经发出了警报。12月5号，中国正在干涉澳大利亚的政治、大学和出版业的指控已经让澳大利亚政府制定出新法律，去处理那些“前所未有而且越发老练”的，试图影响本国立法委员的外国势力。本周，一个澳大利亚参议员辞职了。因为他被指控收了中国的钱，然后站在反政府的立场上为中国说话。英国、加拿大和新西兰也接连开始拉响警报。12月10号，德国指控中国试图在培养亲中的政治家和官员。12月13号，(德国)国会举行了讨论中国不断增长的影响力的听证会。

这一系列行为有一个名字，叫“锐实力”。“锐实力”这个词是由华盛顿的智库，国家民主基金会(National Endowment for Democracy)所创造的。“软实力”利用文化和价值观的诱导，来强化一个国家的实力，而锐实力帮助威权政权绑架和操纵国外的观点。

西方需要对中国的行为作出回应，但是不能简单地对中国竖起高墙。中国不像以前的苏联，它是世界经济的一部分。与深沟壁垒相反，在这个政治家极度短缺的时代，西方需要找寻一个有政治风度的中立立场。而这应开始于了解锐实力以及它是怎么发挥作用的。

影响有影响力的人(Influence the influencer)

像很多国家一样，中国长期以来试图用签证、金援、投资和文化来追求自身利益。但是它最近的行动越发显得有胁迫性而且无处不在。它的锐实力有一系列环环相扣的组成部分：颠覆政府、霸凌小国和施加压力。这三者又组合在一起来促使“自我审查”。对中国来说，终极大奖是先发制人地接受那些它影响力还未能及，不过害怕失去中国的金援、管道和影响的国家的跪拜。中国在历史上长期监视着其在海外的华人，不过颠覆(外国政府)的行动已经铺开。据称，在澳大利亚和新西兰，中国的钞票借着给政党或者单个政治家献金的名义，早已买下了(当地)政界的影响力。本周，德国情报机构抱怨称：中国利用领英的商业网络，搞一些人来伪装成招聘者或智库学者，还提供免费的旅行来诱捕(他国)政治家或政府官员。

中国的霸凌也换了新套路。有时候释出的信号是很露骨的，比如中国因诺贝尔和平奖颁给了一位中国民运人士而从经济上惩罚挪威。不过更常见的是，比如说，对中国的批评并不会在新闻发布会上让发言人直白表达，又或者学术讨论避开研究那些中国视为敏感的话题。个体遭受打压的例子看起来很渺小，(中共)官员在其中扮演的角色也很难度量。不过(惹到中共)后果常常十分严重：西方的许多教授不得不在压力下宣布放弃(研究敏感话题);外国研究者可能会再也没法看到中国的档案资料;政策制定者也许会发现中国本土专家因为太缺乏必要的信息而无法帮助他们。

中国已经如此地融入世界经济、政治和文化生活，西方不得不面对这种压力。西方政府也许会更加珍视贸易而忽视在外交的上得分，比如希腊在一间中国公司刚投资比雷埃夫斯港口后，对欧盟一份批判中国人权记录的声明动用了否决权。经济问题是如此之重要，以至于无须中国多言，商业就常常随着中国的节拍起舞。一家澳大利亚出版社最近突然收回出版一本引用了对“北京的超级特工(agents of influence)”的恐惧的书。

(注：超级特工Anagent of influenceis an agent of some stature who uses his or her position to influencepublic opinion or decision making to produce results beneficial to the country whose intelligence service operates the agent.)

该怎么办?

面对来自澳大利亚和德国的抱怨，中国称这些批评是不负责任的而且是偏执的，实际上是非常危险的反华臆想。然而，如果中国诚实的话，它会指出这仅仅是国家变得强大之时，对影响力的渴望而已。

中国在它的国界外比过去面临更多的风险。从1978年起，大约一千万中国人已经移居国外。中国当局担心他们会从外国人那里染上民主的毛病然后传染回中国。分别地(Separately)，中国的公司正在富裕国家投资，投资领域包括(自然)资源、战略性基础设施和农地。中国的海军已经能在海外远距离地投射力量。中国政府老是苦恼它在国外的坏印象会有不好的影响。作为崛起中的超级大国，中国有很大的胃口要去重塑全球参与秩序——目前的秩序大都是由美国和西欧国家制定的，而且总是被他们拿来援引，去证明他们自己的行为的正当性。

为了确保中国的崛起是和平的，西方需要为中国的雄心让出空间。但这不意味着一切都让中国为所欲为。开放的社会忽视中国的锐实力会很危险。他们的防范措施应该切实一点。反情报行动、法律和独立媒体是应对颠覆活动的最好保护。这三者需要有抓住政治和经济联系的中国发言人。中共长期以来压迫自由言论、公开辩论和独立思考，以此巩固自己的控制。仅是让它的锐实力策略为世人所知并且让那些跪拜磕头的国家感到羞耻，借此来削弱他们的(锐实力)，还有很长的路要走。

一方面，(西方)应该有原则。发起对中国人民的政治迫害是错误的;这也会让西方对法律与规则的坚持变得空洞。来自美国政治家采取以牙还牙，“互惠”措施的呼吁，可以说是公平的自我防卫，比如对学者和非政府组织工作者采取(与中国)对等的签证(政策)。仍然忽视这些(政治)操纵，期望中国在未来变得更友善，只会迎来变本加厉的行为。与此相反(Instead)，西方需要坚守自身的原则。如果可能，就各国合作;如果必要，就分开行动。对西方来说，避开修昔底德陷阱的第一步就是要利用自身的价值观来让中国的锐实力变“钝”。

附原文：

Sharp power

——China is manipulating debate in Western democracies. What can they do about it?

WHEN a risig power challenges an incumbent one, war often follows. That prospect, known as the Thucydides trap after the Greek historian who first described it, looms over relations between China and the West, particularly America. So, increasingly, does a more insidious confrontation. Even if China does not seek to conquer foreign lands, many people fear that it seeks to conquer foreign minds.

Australia was the first to raise a red flag about China’s tactics. On December 5th allegations that China has been interfering in Australian politics, universities and publishing led the government to propose new laws to tackle “unprecedented and increasingly sophisticated” foreign efforts to influence lawmakers . This week an Australian senator resigned over accusations that, as an opposition spokesman, he took money from China and argued its corner. Britain, Canada and New Zealand are also beginning to raise the alarm. On December 10th Germany accused China of trying to groom politicians and bureaucrats. And on December 13th Congress held hearings on China’s growing influence.

This behaviour has a name—“sharp power”, coined by the National Endowment for Democracy, a Washington-based think-tank. “Soft power” harnesses the allure of culture and values to add to a country’s strength; sharp power helps authoritarian regimes coerce and manipulate opinion abroad.

The West needs to respond to China’s behaviour, but it can not simply throw up the barricades. Unlike the old Soviet Un- ion, China is part of the world economy. Instead, in an era when statesmanship is in short supply, the West needs to find a statesmanlike middle ground. That starts with an understanding of sharp power and how it works.

Influencing the influencers

Like many countries, China has long tried to use visas, grants, investments and culture to pursue its interests. But its actions have recently grown more intimidating and encompassing. Its sharp power has a series of interlocking components: subversion, bullying and pressure, which combine to promote self- censorship. For China, the ultimate prize is pre-emptive kowtowing by those whom it has not approached, but who nonetheless fear losing funding, access or influence.

China has a history of spying on its diaspora, but the subversion has spread. In Australia and New Zealand Chinese money is alleged to have bought influence in politics, with party donations or payments to individual politicians. This week’s complaint from German intelligence said that China was using the LinkedIn business network to ensnare politicians and government officials, by having people posing as recruiters and think-tankers and offering free trips.

Bullying has also taken on a new menace. Sometimes the message is blatant, as when China punished Norway economically for awarding a Nobel peace prize to a Chinese pro- democracy activist. More often, as when critics of China are not included in speaker line-ups at conferences, or academics avoid study of topics that China deems sensitive, individual cases seem small and the role of officials is hard to prove. But the effect can be grave. Western professors have been pressed to recant. Foreign researchers may lose access to Chinese archives. Policymakers may find that China experts in their own countries are too ill-informed to help them.

Because China is so integrated into economic, political and cultural life, the West is vulnerable to such pressure. Western governments may value trade over scoring diplomatic points, as when Greece vetoed a European Union statement criticising China’s record on human rights, shortly after a Chinese firm had invested in the port of Piraeus. The economy is so big that businesses often dance to China’s tune without being told to. An Australian publisher suddenly pulled a book, citing fears of “Beijing’s agents of influence”.

What to do?

Facing complaints from Australia and Germany, China has called its critics irresponsible and paranoid—and there is indeed a danger of anti-Chinese hysteria. However, if China were being more truthful, it would point out that its desire for influence is what happens when countries become powerful.

China has a lot more at stake outside its borders today than it did. Some 10m Chinese have moved abroad since 1978. It worries that they will pick up democratic habits from foreigners and infect China itself. Separately, Chinese companies are investing in rich countries, including in resources, strategic infrastructure and farmland. China’s navy can project power far from home. Its government frets that its poor image abroad will do it harm. And as the rising superpower, China has an appetite to shape the rules of global engagement—rules created largely by America and western Europe and routinely invoked by them to justify their own actions.

To ensure China’s rise is peaceful, the West needs to make room for China’s ambition. But that does not mean anything goes. Open societies ignore China’s sharp power at their peril.

Part of their defence should be practical. Counter-intelligence, the law and an independent media are the best protection against subversion. All three need Chinese speakers who grasp the connection between politics and commerce in China.C$h$i$n$e$s$e C$o$m$m$u$n$i$s$t P$a$r$t$y sup$presses fr$ee ex$pression, o$pen de$bate and in$dependent th$ought to ce$ment its control.Part should be principled. Unleashing a witch-hunt against Chinese people would be wrong; it would also make Western claims to stand for the rule of law sound hollow. Calls from American politicians for tit-for-tat “reciprocity”, over visas for academics and NGO workers, say, would be equally self-defeating. Yet ignoring manipulation in the hope that China will be more friendly in the future would only invite the next jab. Instead the West needs to stand by its own principles, with countries acting together if possible, and separately if they must. The first step in avoiding the Thucydides trap is for the West to use its own values to blunt China’s sharp power.